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PREFACE 
This paper is part of a series of political economy Working Papers prepared for the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) 
and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The purpose of these papers is to explore 
strategic political economy issues that would facilitate or inhibit livestock policy 
reforms in the IGAD region that would benefit poor producers. 
Specifically, this paper seeks to understand how the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI), a project jointly managed by 
IGAD and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of FAO (PPLPI), can assist the poor 
livestock producers in the greater Horn of Africa to improve their livelihoods through 
strategic policy or institutional interventions. Unlike many policy papers, however, 
this report specifically and explicitly examines the political context in which livestock 
are produced, and aims to identify entry points that are truly feasible given these 
political realities. The report identifies key national and international actors, 
institutions and processes that surround formal and informal policy-making relevant to 
livestock production, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally, strategies 
and resources required to make the politically feasible changes and creations possible. 
The recommendations made in this paper are therefore based on strategic choices, 
and not the technical or economic merits of various policy options. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries, and especially those 
of the Horn of Africa. Animals are a source of protein for human diets and can serve to 
provide income, employment and foreign exchange within a country. For many low 
income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides draught power 
and organic fertilizer for crop production, acts as a means of transport, and serves as 
a vital component of social functions and exchange. Consumption of livestock and 
livestock products in developing countries, though starting from a low base, is growing 
rapidly. This sector growth could provide opportunities for the livestock-dependent 
poor to improve their livelihood, and this report aims to recommend politically 
feasible policy and institutional changes that can allow this to happen. 
To arrive at its recommendations, this report uses the analytic tools of political 
science to determine policies that will be truly feasible in a particular real-world 
political context.  The author is neither an economist nor a specialist in livestock 
production and is not using the criteria of those disciplines in its suggestions.  The 
report instead seeks to select on the grounds of political feasibility from among the 
recommendations that local and international experts have made on technical or 
economic grounds. Thus, the report identifies key national and international actors, 
institutions and processes and their role in policy-making relevant to livestock, the 
institutional bases of existing policies, and finally strategies and resources required to 
make selected changes and creations possible. 
Methodologically, the paper is based on several weeks of field work in the area, 
supplemented with a thorough review of government documents, newspapers and 
recently published research. The author relied foremost upon the informed observer 
method of research, conducting interviews with individuals and groups of people in a 
position to understand the political economy of the livestock sector, including the 
processes that shape its policies and their reform. Thus interviews were held with 
those in the government, the donor community, non-governmental organizations, 
academia, and the leadership of relevant livestock and other civil society 
organizations. These interviews were not a ‘random sample’ nor even necessarily 
‘representative’; the author sought those who had knowledge drawn from their own 
work and experience.  
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Due to the sensitive political nature of this research, interviewees were offered 
anonymity and confidentiality for their statements, and very few people chose to 
waive this right. Even though this report cannot cite their names, the author 
subjected informants’ statements to high standards of rigor. The author sought to be 
conscious of any partisan bias or rumour that informants might have had in their 
report and whether they were actually in a position to know on personal or very strong 
secondary authority what they reported. In most cases corroboration for key analytic 
points was sought as well, either from other informants or through quotable 
statements from academic literature. Where corroboration was impossible and the 
point was important the author generally has indicated the number of people who 
supported the point, so the reader can judge for him/herself the strength of the 
evidence. On occasion, the use of corroboration via academic literature may give the 
paper a ‘desk study’ veneer, but it is the understandings of the informants – analyzed 
with the theoretical tools of political science – that drive the conclusions.  
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the authors, IGAD LPI, FAO PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector 
Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its 
authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.  
The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not 
constitute in any way the position of the FAO, IGAD,  the Livestock Policy Initiative nor 
the governments studied.  
 
David K. Leonard 
Research Director 
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) 
 
Date of publication: 2007. 
 
 iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 
EPLF Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation 
MoA Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of Eritrea 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
PFDJ  People’s Front for Democracy and Justice 
UNMEE  United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
USAID United States Agency for the International Development 
WFP World Food Programme of the United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 v 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The growing demand for livestock and livestock products in Eritrea and the Middle East 
offers opportunities to improve the livelihoods of the livestock-dependent poor.  
However, current policies and structures in Eritrea disadvantage the livestock sector 
and discourage investment.  Feasible interventions are suggested to facilitate the 
adoption and implementation of livestock policies that serve the interests of the poor. 
The livestock sector has the potential to make a significant contribution to economic 
development, food security, and poverty reduction in Eritrea.  Many Eritreans depend 
on livestock for draught power, food, income, fertilizer, fuel, transportation, asset 
accumulation, and investments in traditional social insurance systems.  The export of 
animals and animal products used to provide significant earnings and could again in 
the future.  Furthermore, in drought-prone Eritrea livestock offer the most common 
coping mechanism for staving off disaster.  Although the potential for livestock is high, 
Eritrea must overcome significant constraints if it is to satisfy domestic needs and 
penetrate foreign markets. To date the livestock sector has received relatively little 
attention in national development policies and public and private investment in the 
livestock sector is quite low given the sector’s potential.   
The livestock sector is negatively affected by the same factors that depress 
investment in other sectors of the economy.  For example, the border conflict with 
Ethiopia (1998-2000) killed over 70,000 people, displaced nearly a third of the 
population, destroyed assets including livestock, and ruined essential infrastructure.  
Ongoing tensions – as a result of Ethiopia’s refusal to comply with the UN Eritrea-
Ethiopia Boundary Commission ruling – continue to prevent traditional cross-border 
livestock migration and trade, divert resources from development to emergency 
provisions and security, delay implementation of decentralization and land reform 
policies, create labour shortages, and squash incentives for investment.  The 
overvalued exchange rate and other government interventions in the economy reduce 
exports, exacerbate macroeconomic imbalances, crowd out private businesses, and 
create a labyrinth of regulations that slow economic activity and privilege the 
powerful.  Current practices impede the flow of information, dampen civic 
organization, reduce stakeholder influence on policies, and lower civil service 
performance.  Finally, deteriorating relations between Eritrea and the international 
community hinder the delivery of aid and emergency services to populations in need. 
In addition to suffering from constraints that affect the whole economy, the livestock 
sector is especially disadvantaged relative to other economic sectors.  The 
government has adopted policies that extract resources from the dispersed, 
impoverished, isolated and powerless livestock producers in favour of the relatively 
more concentrated, affluent, better-connected and powerful elites, urban consumers, 
and highland crop cultivators.  The level of extraction from the livestock sector has 
increased since 1998 as a result of deteriorating economic conditions.  The result has 
been both an absolute and relative decline in the welfare of the livestock sector. 
There are strategic entry points that can advance the interests of the poor in Eritrea.  
In Chapter 10 of the Eritrean National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy 
the Ministry of Agriculture provides a clear assessment of the main constraints to 
livestock development in Eritrea and makes a series of technical recommendations on 
how to alleviate these constraints.  The recommendations are based on consultations 
with stakeholders and on the best available data.  As such, the Eritrean National 
Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy should act as a blueprint for any action 
or investment by the government, non-governmental organizations, and the foreign 
aid community.  Rather than replicate the Ministry of Agriculture recommendations, a 
different but complimentary approach is taken in this report.  It suggests interventions 
that can enhance the likelihood that the Ministry of Agriculture recommendations will 
be successfully implemented.  It proposes measures that are feasible given the current 
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conditions in Eritrea and that provide influential individuals and groups with greater 
incentives and the capabilities to execute the newly recommended pro-poor livestock 
policies. The proposed strategic entry points are the following. 
Plan for eventualities and prioritize policies 
In order to regain the reform momentum, The Ministry of Agriculture should be 
encouraged to plan for policy implementation under three different scenarios (the 
status quo, resumption of war with Ethiopia, and resolution of the crisis).  In 
developing the three plans the Ministry of Agriculture and its partners should do a 
cost-benefit analysis of the recommendations from the Eritrean National Agricultural 
Development Strategy and Policy and prioritize activities accordingly.  The 
recommendations that provide the most benefit to the poor should be identified and 
encouraged. 
Cultivate allies and livestock advocates 
Lack of attention to livestock issues is perhaps the most serious obstacle to 
implementation of the Ministry of Agriculture recommendations.  There is a need to 
cultivate more powerful allies and advocates for the livestock sector in general and 
for poor producers in particular.  Those who want to assist the livestock-dependent 
poor should seek to: 1) persuade influential individuals in government of the 
importance of livestock to their key policy goals of acquiring foreign currency, food 
security, poverty reduction, and national security; 2) create a separate Animal 
Production Department within the Ministry of Agriculture to advocate for livestock 
issues; 3) decentralize government decision-making and service delivery in a manner 
that enhances the influence of livestock producers and technical persons and 
minimizes the influence of centrally-appointed individuals; 4) work with existing local 
institutions at the village or community level to develop appropriate and responsive 
programs; 5) strengthen producer associations and help them maintain their 
independence; 6) encourage donors to target funding to livestock development; and 7) 
enlist Eritreans in the diaspora in livestock development activities. 
Upgrade information quality and availability 
Improving the amount and flow of reliable and timely information will help persuade 
potential allies of the value of investing in livestock processes and facilitate the 
implementation of chosen policies.  The National Agricultural Research Institute and 
institutions of agricultural education in Eritrea should act to ensure that the 
connection between research and education and that the quality of these two spheres 
is not undermined by the closure of the University of Asmara.  In addition, the Ministry 
of Agriculture or the Ministry of Foreign Trade should establish a livestock marketing 
information unit to provide timely data on domestic and foreign markets and to act as 
a liaison between Eritreans and foreign traders.  Finally, there is a need for greater 
investment in monitoring and evaluation systems as well as for greater cooperation 
between the Eritrean government and international agencies in the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of data. 
Enact laws and systems for exports 
Eritrea can achieve a comparative advantage in the export of livestock and livestock 
products only if it has a credible animal health certification regime.  It is essential 
that the Ministry of Agriculture work with the Ministry of Justice to speed up the 
enactment of livestock legislation, so that Eritrea has an inspection and certification 
regime based on a solid legal foundation that is in harmony with international trade 
requirements.  Such a regime also requires significant infrastructure and 
administrative investments.  Export development would be greatly enhanced by 
institutional changes that consolidate livestock export marketing functions under a 
single ministry or agency.   
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Revise land policy 
The Ministry of Land, Water, and Environment in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Agriculture should reconsider land policies with special attention to their effect on 
livestock production as well as pastoral and agro-pastoral lifestyles.  Research is 
needed on the relative benefits for food security and poverty reduction of 
horticulture, commercial ranching, and traditional small-scale livestock production by 
pastoralists or agro-pastoralists.  An informed re-evaluation of the government’s 
official policy to “bring under cultivation vast tracts of fertile land” is urgent.   
Reduce government involvement and control 
The Eritrean National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy recognizes that:  
“Government’s role in livestock is regulatory and that production and processing 
should be in private hands”.  The Ministry of Agriculture should privatize veterinary 
care, artificial insemination services, importation and distribution and livestock 
medications, credit provision, feed importation and production, slaughterhouses, milk 
and meat processing facilities, and chick hatcheries.  Currently, demand for 
government services far outstrips supply and the livestock-dependent poor are 
crowded out by those with more resources and influence.  Importantly, however, 
privatization without lifting controls will not alleviate shortages, deliver the benefits 
of competition, or free up government manpower.  The most fundamental first step in 
the process of reducing government distortions is to allow a market-valued exchange 
rate.  The government should also avoid price fixing, rationing, and restrictive 
licensing.  The state could subsidize private suppliers who deliver services and goods 
to remote areas rather than providing services themselves at below market prices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a case study of the political economy of livestock policies in 
Eritrea.  The goal of the paper is to identify obstacles to the formulation and 
implementation of livestock policies that promote economic development, sustainable 
food security, and poverty reduction.  The growing demand for livestock and livestock 
products offers opportunities to improve the livelihoods of the livestock-dependent 
poor.  However, private and public investment in the livestock sector is lower than it 
should be.  The paper exposes how current structures and practices in Eritrea 
disadvantage the livestock sector relative to other economic activities and 
government priorities.  It suggests feasible interventions to facilitate the successful 
implementation of policies that serve the interests of the livestock-dependent poor. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The first section provides an overview of the livestock 
sector, its importance, and the constraints to its development in Eritrea.  The second 
section analyzes the economic and policy environment within which livestock 
processes take place.  The third section looks more specifically at how the overall 
environment affects the livestock sector.  The final section suggests changes that can 
support more productive and pro-poor livestock sector activities in Eritrea. 
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PART I:  THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR IN ERITREA 
Livestock Production 
The livestock sector in Eritrea is populated mainly by small-scale producers.  Most 
livestock owners are poor, although individuals who are extremely poor often do not 
own livestock.  Indigenous small ruminants are the most numerous types of livestock, 
and camels, cattle, and poultry are also prevalent in the country.  Donkeys and horses 
are used for transportation, apiculture is practiced in some areas, and there is a small 
amount of swine production.  Natural pasture is the main source of nutrition for 
livestock, supplemented by crop residues, industrial by-products, and commercial 
feeds. The quantity and quality of forage is determined primarily by the amount and 
distribution of rainfall and forage is often in short supply due to recurrent drought, 
overgrazing, and an acute shortage of grazing land (Government of Eritrea 2006; 
National Food Information System of Eritrea 2005).  Most of the livestock production is 
in the arid and semi-arid lowland areas, but livestock ownership is also common in the 
more densely populated highland areas.  
 There are four key livestock production systems in Eritrea: pastoralism, agro-
pastoralism, sedentary mixed farming, and urban or peri-urban production.  True 
pastoralists are migratory and depend primarily or exclusively on animals for their 
livelihoods; they are increasingly rare in Eritrea.  Pastoralists belong primarily to the 
Afar, Rashida, Hidareb, Saho, and Beni Amer ethnic groups located in arid northern 
Anseba, North Red Sea, and South Red Sea Zobas (FAO and WFP 2005; Government of 
Eritrea 2006).  Camels and goats are the most numerous animals in their herds.  
Pastoralists rely heavily on the milk of cattle, goats, and camels for sustenance, and 
while some animals are slaughtered for meat, most are sold for cash income.  
Pastoralists typically do not use animals for crop production, to the extent that they 
engage in crop cultivation at all.  They prepare the land by hand, do not use animal 
dung, and do not carry or store crop residues.  Instead, they rely almost entirely on 
grazing and browsing in the rangelands to feed their livestock (FAO and WFP 2005; 
Government of Eritrea 2006).    
Agro-pastoralists plant a larger area and wider variety of crops. Unlike 
pastoralists, they use oxen to prepare land for planting, sometimes fertilize 
their farms with manure, and collect and store crop residues for animals.  In 
addition to cattle, agro-pastoralists keep donkeys, camels, sheep and goats.  
Most pastoralists and agro-pastoralists move their animals seasonally to make 
use of different climatic conditions and harvest periods, as well as to avoid 
pests and diseases.  They also move animals in response to seasonal market 
demands.  The largest numbers of agro-pastoralists belong to the Tigre or 
Tigrinya ethnic groups (Government of Eritrea 2006).  A large share of the total 
livestock population of the country is kept by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. 
Sedentary mixed farmers have herd compositions that are similar to those of the 
agro-pastoralists, but they typically derive a smaller proportion of their income 
from livestock and are less mobile.  Nonetheless, even some of the animals of 
the sedentary farmers migrate seasonally, especially in dry years.  Thus, 
movement of herds is a characteristic of a large share of Eritrea’s livestock 
production.  Most sedentary mixed farmers belong to the Tigrinya ethnic group 
(Government of Eritrea 2006).  Livestock is still an important asset for sedentary 
households in the rural areas, though not to the same extent as in the other 
systems.  Oxen are particularly important for ploughing, thinning, and threshing 
cultivated crops and livestock and livestock products provide the most 
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important source of income after produce (National Food Information System of 
Eritrea 2005). 
 
Urban and peri-urban farmers specialize in dairy production and, to a lesser extent, 
animal fattening and poultry.  Most dairy farms are in and around Asmara, though 
there are also many in the areas of Decemhare, Mendefera, and Keren.  Urban and 
peri-urban farmers are more dependent on purchased feed than rural producers, and 
poor nutrition is a significant constraint on dairy production and animal fattening (FAO 
and WFP 2005; Government of Eritrea 2006).  Poultry production was on the increase 
until severe feed shortages led to a crisis in commercial production.  The banning of 
imports due to the avian flu crisis further decimated the industry, though indigenous 
backyard poultry are still common in urban and rural areas. 
Importance and Potential of Livestock 
Livestock are critical to the subsistence and wellbeing of most Eritreans.  Eritrea is 
predominantly an agricultural society, and approximately 80 percent of the population 
lives in rural areas (World Bank 2006).  Over 98 percent of Eritrean farmers raise 
livestock of some form although the level of dependence on livestock varies 
considerably across populations and regions (Government of Eritrea 2006).  For the 20 
to 30 percent of the rural population that are pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, 
livestock provide the primary source of subsistence and economic wellbeing (African 
Development Fund 2006).  However, livestock also contribute significantly to the 
livelihoods of sedentary mixed farmers and urban or peri-urban populations.  Livestock 
provide:  
1. Drought power for cultivation of crops.  
2. Food in the form of animal fat and protein. 
3. Income and employment through the sale or trade of live animals, animal 
products, and provision of transportation services. 
4. Fertilizer and fuel from animal manure. 
5. Transportation of goods and people. 
6. Household supplies, such as hides. 
7. Assets that can be accumulated to protect against risk in an environment where 
alternative savings vehicles and sources of credit are limited. 
8. Investments in traditional social systems that provide insurance against disaster 
and help to equalize wealth. 
For all of these reasons, poverty is associated with lower ownership and access to 
livestock among sedentary mixed farmers as well as among pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists (Government of Eritrea 2004). 
The importance of livestock to both household- and national-level food security in 
Eritrea deserves special emphasis.  Livestock supply nutritional requirements in the 
form of milk, meat, and eggs; provide cash for purchasing grain and other essentials; 
and serve as the principle form of savings and insurance for rural populations.  A 2003 
assessment of rural livelihood security indicated that livestock are the main coping 
mechanism used by farmers and pastoralists to stave off disaster (Government of 
Eritrea 2004).  Livestock are especially fundamental to food security in Eritrea due to 
difficult climatic and topographic conditions.  As compared to rain fed crop farming, 
livestock herds are less susceptible to Eritrea’s erratic rainfall and livestock can 
subsist on steep slopes and in arid areas where cultivation is more costly, risky and 
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damaging to the environment.  Less than 5 percent of Eritrea’s land is under 
cultivation, but approximately 56 percent is used for browsing and grazing (Kayouli, 
Tesfai, and Tewolde 2002; see also: FAO 2005).   
In addition to enhancing food security, livestock are also an important part of the 
national economy, although the full economic potential of the livestock sector is not 
realized at present.  Livestock contribute an estimated 63.1 percent of the 
agricultural GDP and 6.6 percent of total GDP (FAO 2005).1  The export of live 
animals, skins, hides and leather products used to be a significant source of foreign 
currency for Eritrea.  As recently as 1994, livestock exports accounted for 33 percent 
of official exports, and unofficial exports were also significant. However, exports of 
livestock and livestock products have declined dramatically since then, largely due to 
war, border closures, high transaction costs, and Saudi Arabia’s trade ban on live 
animals due to the outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in East Africa.2  Furthermore, the 
domestic demand for livestock products is growing faster than domestic production, 
and importation of livestock products is increasing to fill the gap (Government of 
Eritrea 2006). 
Constraints on the Livestock Sector 
The potential for increasing revenue from livestock is high, but Eritrea must improve 
the quality of its products, raise productivity, and expand access to markets if it is to 
satisfy domestic needs and penetrate foreign markets (Government of Eritrea 2004).  
The challenges to livestock development in Eritrea are large.  Based on a participatory 
policy-making process, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) identified a list of the main 
constraints in the livestock sector.  This list, from a draft of the Eritrean National 
Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy,3 has been reproduced in the appendix.  
The main constraints can be summarized as: feed, water, land, labour, credit, and 
foreign currency shortages; poor infrastructure particularly with regard to 
transporting, processing, and exporting livestock and livestock products; anaemic 
government services and regulatory framework; and a hostile or competitive regional 
market.  Feed and water shortages are the most common and challenging constraints 
for most livestock owners, especially for the poor. 
As the result of their consultations for the National Agricultural Strategy, the MoA 
concluded that “much remains to be done and investment in the livestock sector up to 
now is far below what its potential warrants” and “the livestock sector’s potential is 
very high and it merits greater priority in national development policies” (Government 
of Eritrea 2006).  Given the high potential of the livestock sector, what accounts for 
the current low levels of public and private investment?  Additionally, what policy and 
institutional changes might facilitate more productive and pro-poor livestock sector 
activities? 
The goal of this study is to understand why the current constraints on the livestock 
sector exist, and more importantly, to analyze the role of institutional structures in 
alleviating or aggravating these constraints.  It also seeks to explain why livestock 
production is disadvantaged relative to other sectors of the economy.  In order to do 
so it is first necessary to examine the current conditions in the country.  The next 
                                                 
1 Note that these figures are highly variable over time because the erratic weather conditions produce large fluctuations in 
agricultural production from year to year. 
2 Eritrea’s small ruminants still supply hides for the export-oriented leather industries, but these industries also suffered 
considerably from border closures. 
3 In the remainder of this paper the Eritrean National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy is referred to simply as 
The National Agricultural Strategy. 
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section provides a general overview of the political economy of Eritrea, while the 
following sections look more specifically at how the overall environment affects the 
livestock sector.   
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PART II: GENERAL CONTEXT 
Historical Overview 
Eritrea’s past and present development has been shaped as much by forces outside of 
the country as those within.  Eritrea was an Italian colony that passed briefly to the 
British as a result of World War II.  In 1952, the United Nations decided to link Eritrea 
to Ethiopia under a federal system of government.  Ethiopia’s forcible annexation of 
Eritrea a decade later sparked a 30-year struggle for independence.  In 1991 the 
Eritrea Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) defeated Ethiopian governmental forces and 
won independence, which the Eritrean people overwhelmingly approved in a 1993 
referendum.   
After a brief period of stability and development, a border conflict between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia erupted into open warfare in 1998.  In December 2000 the UN brokered a 
peace treaty and both countries agreed to binding arbitration of the border.  An 
international peace-keeping force, UNMEE, maintains troops and observers along the 
twenty-five-kilometre-wide Temporary Security Zone between the two countries. The 
UN Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission announced its decision on April 13, 2002, 
and initially both parties accepted the results. However, Ethiopia’s subsequent refusal 
to accept the implementation of the commission’s ruling prevented the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict and tensions between the two countries remain extremely 
high until now (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006; World Bank 2006; African 
Development Fund 2006; CIA 2006; Government of Eritrea 2004; Amnesty International 
2006).  Eritrea has repeatedly urged the international community to place greater 
pressure on Ethiopia to comply with the ruling, but without success.  The festering 
insecurity has dramatic negative consequences for both countries, but these 
consequences are more disastrous for Eritrea because of its small size and limited 
wealth.  The conflict with Ethiopia dominates Eritrea’s economic and political agenda. 
Economic Context 
The Eritrean Government’s recent policies have had a large deleterious effect on 
economic fortunes and individual welfare, accentuating rather than mitigating severe 
environmental and external constraints.  The 30-year war left newly independent 
Eritrea with a devastated infrastructure, inefficient industries, unproductive crop and 
livestock enterprises, negligent exports, an anaemic private sector, and widespread 
poverty.  In the initial period after independence, the government focused on 
reconstruction of its economic and social infrastructure, and adopted a macro 
economic framework for advancing market-driven economic recovery and poverty 
alleviation.  Significant progress was made and the country realized very strong 
economic growth with low inflation during this period.  However, the border conflict 
with Ethiopia (1998-2000) and severe drought (2002-2003) precipitated economic 
collapse (Government of Eritrea 2004).  The Eritrean economy, strangled by the 
unresolved tensions with Ethiopia and the invasive actions of the government, has not 
yet recovered from the overlapping manmade and natural crises. 
Eritrea ranks among the world’s poorest countries and it has extremely high levels of 
poverty.  In 2005, Eritrea had a gross national income of US$ 0.97 billion, and a per 
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capita income of US$ 220 (World Bank 2006).4  In the same year, Eritrea was ranked 
161 out of 177 countries based on the Human Development Index (CIA 2006).  
According to the Eritrean Living Standard Measurement Survey of 2003, 66 percent of 
the population is below the poverty line and 37 percent live under extreme poverty.5  
65 percent of the rural population is poor and 39 percent are extremely poor, while 70 
percent of urban residents are poor and 33 percent are extremely poor.  The greatest 
numbers of poor people live in the more densely populated highland regions, but 
poverty is more pervasive in arid lowland areas.  The nomadic or semi-nomadic 
populations that dominate the arid lowlands suffer higher rates of maternal, infant, 
and child mortality, lower life expectancies, and lower literacy than the more settled 
population in the highlands. Poverty is also more pervasive among the 30 percent of 
households that are headed by women.  Women-headed households have fewer assets, 
including livestock, and there are cultural prohibitions from engaging in certain 
activities, such as ploughing with oxen (Government of Eritrea 2004).   
Eritrea also has some of the highest food insecurity and malnutrition rates in the 
world.  On average, once every ten years the country is threatened with famine.  Even 
during good years, the country can produce only 60 percent of its food requirements, 
and during bad years they produce 15 percent or below.  In 2003 domestic food 
production was only 9 percent of what was required (African Development Fund 2006).  
Unfavourable soil and climatic conditions make it unlikely that Eritrea will ever be 
self-sufficient with respect to food, although some improvements in productivity are 
feasible.  The government aims to make use of Eritrea’s extensive coastline and 
strategic position to build a service and trade-based economy.  However, acute 
foreign currency shortages currently make it difficult for Eritreans to purchase food 
from abroad in order to meet their food requirements; as a result they are highly 
dependent on donor food aid.   
The incidence of food insecurity is related to, but still distinct from the incidence of 
poverty.  Highland residents depend on rain-fed agriculture as their primary livelihood 
strategy, and although they tend to be wealthier on average, they are more food 
insecure because they depend on fewer livelihood activities and crop cultivation is 
more sensitive to weather conditions than livestock. Residents of the arid lowland 
zones appear to have a greater diversity of livelihood activities, which allows them to 
spread their risks. They depend on livestock as their main source of subsistence, 
income, and savings and they own animals that are more drought tolerant.  As a 
result, their economic activities are less susceptible to climate variability 
(Government of Eritrea 2004).  
The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war and its aftermath had a devastating effect on an 
already fragile economy.  The war killed between 70,000 and 100,000 people and 
displaced nearly a third of the Eritrean population, which then had to be supported in 
camps.6  In addition, between 75,000 and 80,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean 
descent were deported from Ethiopia to Eritrea, most without their belongings (this is 
in addition to the approximately 104,000 Eritreans who were repatriated from Sudan 
since 2001).  The war was primarily fought on Eritrean territory, and it destroyed 
whole villages, damaged schools and clinics, ruined water supply systems and roads, 
killed thousands of livestock, burned other productive assets, and left the area full of 
mines.7  The war was particularly damaging because the border area in the southwest 
                                                 
4 This compares with an average GNI of US$552 million for Sub-Saharan Africa and US$1,364 million for low income countries, 
and an average GNI per capita of US$745 for Sub-Saharan Africa and US$580 for low income countries.  All figures are 
calculated using the Atlas method (World Bank 2006). 
5 The survey was conducted during a period of extreme drought and analysis suggests that the overall poverty incidence 
would have been approximately 56 percent under normal weather conditions (Government of Eritrea 2004). 
6 50,000 internally displaced people were still living in camps in January 2006. 
7 The May 2000 Ethiopian offensive into northern Eritrea reportedly caused $600 million in property damage and loss 
(including losses of $225 million in livestock and 55,000 homes) and led to a 62 percent drop in food production (CIA 2006). 
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is the most fertile region for agricultural production and because pastoralists 
depended on movement between the two countries to maintain their livestock and 
livelihoods (African Development Fund 2006; FAO and WFP 2005; Government of 
Eritrea 2004; Rena 2005; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).  The government also 
had to redirect considerable funds from development to emergency relief.  More 
significantly, defence expenses are estimated to have climbed from 13 percent of GDP 
in 1997 to around 37 percent during the conflict, and dropped only slightly to 24 and 
23 percent in 2001 and 2002 respectively.  Furthermore, much of the workforce is 
engaged in defence activities (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).8  The threat of a 
resumption of the war serves as a strong disincentive to foreign and domestic 
investment. 
One of the most economically damaging results of the war has been the loss of 
Eritrea’s main export market and trading partner.  In 1997, prior to the border 
conflict, Ethiopia accounted for about 72 percent of the value of Eritrea’s external 
trade.  Official trade with Ethiopia dropped to zero after 1998 (African Development 
Fund 2006). Trade difficulties deepened when Eritrea and Sudan ended diplomatic 
relations and closed their common border in October 2002 (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2006).9  Eritrea’s exports of goods and services declined dramatically from 
US$200 million in 1997 to US$80 million in 2003 (African Development Fund 2006).10  In 
addition to losing their main trading partner, Eritrea lost Ethiopian business at Assab 
port, which had accounted for 90 percent of the port’s business (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2006).  There is an urgent need to find new trading partners and new 
markets for exports in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. 
The economic effect of the war is evident in the decline of the growth rate (although 
the severe drought also contributed significantly to the decline).  In the five year 
period from 1993 to 1997 Eritrea had an average growth rate of 7 percent, while in the 
five year period from 2000 to 2004 growth was only 1.5 percent.  Following the start 
of war, the real GDP growth rate fell to zero in 1999 and negative 12.1 percent in 
2000, even before the full impact of the drought was felt.  Growth peaked again at 4.8 
percent in 2005 due to exceptionally good rains after years of drought.  However, GDP 
growth is projected to slow to only 1.5 percent and 1.3 percent in 2006 and 2007 
respectively (African Development Fund 2006).  
The shutdown of trade with Ethiopia, the dramatic increase of government spending 
on defence, emergency provisions, and oil products created dangerous macroeconomic 
imbalances.  The internal and external imbalances are manifest in an acute shortage 
of foreign exchange, very low domestic saving and investment, large fiscal deficits, 
unsustainable domestic and external debt, and high inflation.  At the end of 2003 
international reserves amounted to only two weeks of imports and by the end of 2004 
only 0.36 months of imports.  Eritrea’s budget deficit, which had been 19.4 percent of 
GDP (including grants) in 1996 and 4.2 percent in 1997, rose to 38 percent in 1998 and 
peaked at 54 percent in 1999 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).  The deficit was 
                                                 
8 Mass conscription following the outbreak of war swelled the size of the military to an estimated 250,000 soldiers in May 
2000.  Subsequent demobilization was slow and  the armed forces still retained more than 200,000 troops and another 
120,000 reservists in 2005 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
9 Border trade with Sudan was officially re-established at the end of 2006, but in all likelihood, official trade will continue to 
be subject to the waxing and waning of diplomatic relationships between the two countries.  Mutual accusations of support 
for each other’s opposition groups have led to several border closures since Eritrean independence.  Eritrea accused Sudan of 
supporting attacks by Islamist groups in Eritrea, including an attempted assassination of Afewerki in 1997.  Sudan accused 
Eritrea of supporting rebel groups in Southern Sudan, and more recently in the East and Darfur.  In 2002, Sudan broke off 
relations and closed the border citing an increase in attacks from groups based in Eritrea.  Following the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement by the Sudanese government and the SPLM in January 2005, Sudan and Eritrea began a tentative 
rapprochement.  The Eritrean-mediated peace between the Sudanese government and eastern rebels in October 2006 led to 
a full restoration of cross-border links between Sudan and Eritrea (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
10 The main destinations for Eritrea’s exports in 2002 were Sudan, Italy, Djibouti and Germany, so the loss of Sudan as a 
trading partner also contributed significantly to the overall decline in exports.  The value of goods and services imported to 
Eritrea in 2005 ($US 572 million) swamped the value of their exports (US$64 million) (World Bank 2006). 
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reduced to 22 percent of GDP in 2005 (African Development Fund 2006).11  Inflation 
reached 25 percent in 2000 but was reduced to approximately 10 percent in 2005 
where it is projected to remain for several years (World Bank 2006; African 
Development Fund 2006).  However, the drop in inflation resulted from large scale 
state importation of basic commodities, price controls for essential consumer goods, 
and setting the exchange rate at an overvalued level, interventions that have many 
undesirable consequences (World Bank 2006). 
Maintaining an overvalued exchange rate induces additional government interventions 
and distorts economic incentives.  An overvalued exchange rate subsidizes imports 
because fewer Nakfa are required to purchase goods abroad than under a market-
based exchange rate.  This generates excess demand for imported goods and foreign 
currency, which the government rations through import licenses and controls (African 
Development Fund 2006).  It also drives down the value of domestically produced 
goods that compete with cheap imports.  In addition, an overvalued exchange rate 
makes Eritrean exports more expensive, thus dampening foreign demand for goods 
produced in Eritrea.  The results are increasing trade imbalances, shortages of foreign 
currency, and elaborate and easily corruptible rationing regimes (Bates 1981). 
Shortages of foreign currency will continue to be a serious impediment to government 
and private sector development efforts, at least in the near future.  Official trade 
with Ethiopia is unlikely to resume for some time and official trade with Sudan, 
although recently re-established, remains unpredictable.  Other primary sources of 
foreign exchange are also at risk.  Private transfers from Eritreans abroad, which were 
nearly a third of the GDP, are declining.  Remittances were estimated at US$400 
million in 1999, US$308 million in 2003, and US$276 million by 2004.  In addition, 
donor assistance may decline.  Conversely, the Bisha gold-mining  project is scheduled 
to begin production in 2008 and gold revenue could balance out some of the 
anticipated loss in foreign currency from trade, remittances, and aid (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2006).   
Lack of access to foreign markets and macroeconomic imbalances are not the only 
problems plaguing the private sector in Eritrea.  In recent years the government has 
tightened its grip on the economy and created an extremely unfavourable climate for 
private entrepreneurs, both large and small (CIA 2006).  The government claims to 
embrace the tenants of neoliberal reform, and the liberal land and investment laws 
passed in 1994 are evidence of these formal commitments.  However, in practice, 
many civil servants and top leaders appear to be sceptical of private sector led 
economic development.  Privatization gained some momentum immediately after 
independence, but the ruling party and the government have since regained ownership 
control over many of the enterprises that they initially privatized, such as Asmara Milk 
Factory.  Military and party-owned businesses have expanded into additional sectors, 
sometimes by taking over other private enterprises (The Economist Intelligence Unit 
2006).  Furthermore, the government employs cumbersome regulations to maintain 
control over many private businesses that they do not own.  Faced with severe 
shortages of essential goods such as fuel, sugar, milk, and animal feed, the 
government has chosen to impose price controls and rationing mechanisms.  
Additionally, private businesses are faced with complicated and shifting administrative 
requirements and often have to wait for years to obtain permits and essential inputs 
such as land, credit, and imported machinery. 
The heavy government involvement in the economy, either through regulations or 
direct ownership has several deleterious effects.  The benefits of privatization are not 
realized when the government maintains control over key management decisions such 
as pricing and distribution.  Privatization without lifting controls merely shifts the risks 
                                                 
11 Much of the government deficit was financed by bonds sold to Eritreans abroad and by borrowing from Eritrea’s 
commercial banks, as well as some borrowing from abroad (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
 10 
onto the individual owners.  In addition, the heavy involvement of the government and 
the party in business activities has crowded out the private sector in areas such as 
access to credit, labour, foreign currency, and land (African Development Fund 2006; 
The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).  Well performing projects risk government or 
party takeover, further dampening incentives to innovate or invest in new areas.  
Finally, price controls and rationing also erode incentives for domestic or foreign 
investment that otherwise might increase the supply of scarce commodities.  Although 
these non-market mechanisms are ostensibly being used to provide an affordable price 
for the poor, in reality they tend to favour those with access to money and power.  
Wealthy and connected individuals are able to obtain goods at the discounted official 
price, as well as through alternative means.  When services and goods are provided at 
below market prices, power and influence determine access, and the poor are often 
made worse off than if price controls did not exist (Bates 1981).  
In short, the climate for private business in Eritrea is grim and it is getting worse.  The 
World Bank ranked Eritrea 137 out of 155 countries in terms of performance in doing 
business; the measure is based on issues including starting a business, dealing with 
licenses, hiring and firing, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, 
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing business (African 
Development Fund 2006).  The war and government interventions have added new 
challenges to longstanding difficulties of doing business in Eritrea (such as erratic 
rainfall, environmental degradation, unreliable electricity supply, poor 
telecommunication, high costs of transportation, and a scarcity of well educated or 
skilled labour force).  Eritrea’s economic woes are intimately related to its 
government policies. 
State Context 
Currently, Eritrea has a unitary political system that is dominated by the only legal 
party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).  Following independence 
in 1991, the EPLF transformed itself into the PFDJ under the chairmanship of Eritrea’s 
President Isaias Afewerki.  A constitution was completed in 1994 and was ratified by a 
constitutional assembly in May 1997, but has not been formally adopted by the 
Government.  Although the Eritrean Constitution provides for a democratic system 
with a clear separation of powers between the executive and the PFDJ, this has not 
been the case in practice. The Cabinet does not meet regularly and the National 
Assembly only meets when called into session by the President.  Laws concerning 
electoral system reform and the formation of political parties were drafted in 2000-
2001 and the National Assembly approved an electoral law in early 2003, but national 
elections have been postponed indefinitely.  (Elections have taken place at local and 
regional levels: elections for local administrators, village councillors, and regional 
assemblies were conducted in 2002 and 2005; and elections for village judges were 
held in 2004.)  President Afewerki asserts that further democratic reforms are 
infeasible as long the conflict with Ethiopia remains unresolved (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2006; World Bank 2006; African Development Fund 2006; CIA 2006; 
Government of Eritrea 2004; Human Rights Watch 2006; Freedom House 2006). 
There are currently six zobas, or regions, in Eritrea.  In contrast with the ethnic based 
federal system in Ethiopia, zoba boundaries in Eritrea were drawn so that most zobas 
are ethnically, religiously, environmentally, and economically mixed.  Comprehensive 
public-sector restructuring was initiated in 1996, including the adoption of 
decentralization aimed at increasing the effectiveness and responsiveness of public 
service provision. Under decentralization, zoba administrations are supposed to be 
responsible for development planning and implementation.  In addition, local line 
ministry employees are to report directly to the zoba administration and receive 
technical assistance and oversight from respective line ministries.  However, the 
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outbreak of war in 1998 disrupted implementation of decentralization and other 
reforms.  Emergency services are being provided through centralized institutional 
structures, and there is some confusion about proper structures and responsibilities 
for other activities (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2002).  In 2003, a 
World Bank study reported that Eritrea has “low overall levels of decentralization” 
and it was ranked 17th of the 30 African countries included in the study (Ndegwa 
2003).  Although there are official plans to proceed with administrative 
decentralization in the coming year or two, there is a strong centralizing tendency at 
work in the country as well.  The centralized hierarchical structures and practices that 
the PFDJ inherited from the pre-independence Ethiopian regimes at independence 
have been strengthened by the current war with Ethiopia.  It seems likely that 
pressures for greater centralization under the office of the President will overwhelm 
those for decentralization, so that reforms will not be implemented or effective.   
The government also strictly controls citizen organizations of all kinds.  With few 
exceptions, domestic associations are only allowed to function under the auspices of 
the government or the PFDJ (Human Rights Watch 2006).  Proclamation No. 145/2005, 
issued in June 2005, imposed tight restrictions on non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  They are required to register annually and are allowed to work only on 
approved projects in prescribed areas through government structures.  They are 
obliged to pay taxes on imported items including food and relief materials.  In 
addition, international NGOs have to deposit US$2.0 million in a local bank and 
national NGOs have to deposit US$1.0 million (UN Resident Humanitarian Coordinator 
Macleod Nyirongo 2005; The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006; African Development 
Fund 2006; Amnesty International 2006; Freedom House 2006; Human Rights Watch 
2006).  A number of applications for registration were rejected and NGOs were asked 
to shut down. 37 NGOs were working in Eritrea in June 2005 but only 13 were there in 
May 2006 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).  For those NGOs that continue to 
function, the threat of closure, high taxes, and requirements for travel permission 
make operations extremely difficult and costly. 
In addition, many donor agencies have suspended or curtailed development aid 
programs in response to Eritrea’s democratization and human rights record, because 
of security concerns and logistical difficulties, or when the Eritrean government asked 
them to leave (as was the case with USAID).12  Eritrea’s relations with donors and the 
UN have declined precipitously in recent years.  The remaining foreign aid agencies 
work under increasingly difficult circumstances.  For example, the government: 
impounded more than 100 vehicles; imposed increasing limits on travel; restricted the 
international community’s access to data on harvests, food availability, prices, and 
the government budget; reduced the distribution of free food aid; and declined to 
carry out the standard consolidated appeals process in 2006.  Although the exact 
reasons for these actions are unclear, many speculated that the Eritrean government 
is trying to provoke the international community to enforce the decision of the UN 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.  The Eritrean government holds the 
international community (especially the United States and the UN) responsible for 
allowing Ethiopia to violate the terms of the agreement, and for the continued no-
peace no-war situation that is eroding Eritrea’s finances and human capital.  It is also 
plausible that these actions are motivated by the ruling regime’s desire to avoid 
dependency, and their dislike of the economic or political conditions that are often 
linked to aid.  Regardless of the reasons, Eritrea’s deteriorating relations with the 
international community have serious negative consequences for the delivery of aid 
and services to populations in need (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006).   
In official documents and statements, the Government maintains a reasonably pro-
poor and pro-development orientation as presented (For example see the Interim 
                                                 
12 Over the last five years, the US, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway were the highest bilateral aid donors, but 
this is expected to change in the future (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). 
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Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Government of Eritrea 2003).  Officially, food 
security, economic growth, and social development are primary goals of policymakers, 
and prior to the conflict with Ethiopia the civil service made significant progress in 
achieving these goals, particularly in the area of primary health care.  Top 
government officials have officially discarded the Marxist ideology of the pre-
independence EPLF movement in favour of free market capitalism.  However many 
seem to have maintained their primary concern for reducing poverty, and their faith in 
the benefits of government action in achieving these goals.  Self sufficiency is also a 
stated priority for many top government officials.   
 
Although the official policies of the Eritrean government are pro-poor, the practices of 
government increasingly favour those with influence and resources.  Key decisions are 
made by a small group of individuals close to the President, often without sufficient 
regard to the pertinent policy plans, technical expertise, data, or consultations of 
stakeholders.  This is especially true for topics the government deems politically 
sensitive, such as food security, defence, foreign exchange use, and the economy.  
Decision-making processes are shrouded in secrecy and outcomes are unpredictable.  
There are significant bottlenecks, especially in the law-making process.  Many official 
development plans, such as decentralization and land reform, have stalled part way, 
obscuring the consistency and direction that such plans are supposed to create.  The 
result is that key stakeholders are unable to influence decisions.  Only those with 
resources and influence can navigate through cumbersome government processes and 
withstand the unpredictable and obtuse regulations that delay many dealings.  These 
conditions have frustrated most private entrepreneurs, especially among the poor. 
Income inequality has increased to very high level in recent years (Eritrea’s Gini 
Coefficient is 0.45); the wealth of a small minority of individuals has grown while the 
wealth of the majority of the population remained stagnant or declined (FAO and WFP 
2005).  
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PART III: CHALLENGES TO LIVESTOCK SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
The environment described above has led to both public and private underinvestment 
in the livestock sector.  First, the livestock sector is negatively affected by the same 
factors that depress investment in other sectors of the economy.  Second, and perhaps 
more insidious, the livestock sector is disadvantaged relative to other economic 
sectors in the economy.  This section reviews the way in which the challenges to all 
private and public economic activities also depress livestock development.  It then 
provides an explanation for the relative neglect of the interests of livestock 
producers.  The current regime adopted policies that extract resources from the 
dispersed, impoverished, isolated and powerless livestock producers in order to 
appease the relatively more concentrated, affluent, connected and powerful elites, 
urban consumers, and highland crop cultivators.  As the regime has faced increasingly 
unfavourable conditions since 1998, the level of extraction from the livestock sector 
has increased.  The result has been both an absolute and relative decline in the 
welfare of the livestock sector. 
It is acknowledged that the constraints on livestock development in Eritrea are not 
solely the product of government action or subject to decisions by current actors in 
the country.  Factors such as geography and international political market forces, over 
which Eritrea has little influence, are also influential.  For example, Eritrea will suffer 
from erratic rains regardless of government policies, and Eritrea had little or no 
influence over Saudi Arabia’s trade ban on live animals from East Africa, which 
followed the outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in other countries.  However, it is argued 
that most of the natural or external constraints are exacerbated rather than reduced 
by the current policies and activities of Eritrean government. 
Challenges to Private Livestock Activities 
The livestock sector faces many of the challenges to private business that were 
discussed above.  For instance, the most common and widespread constraint for 
livestock producers is insufficient fodder. Lack of fodder is partially a function of 
limited access to foreign currency, which constrains private businessmen from 
importing feed ingredients from abroad.  Shortages could also be partially alleviated 
by expanding domestic green forage crop production, but the process for obtaining 
land and permits for feed production is extremely difficult and slow.  Finally, in 
response to shortages, the government has set up restrictive controls, which further 
dampen incentives for individuals to invest in the production and provision of feed.  
Although feed plants are privately owned, the government regulates the supply of 
ingredients, the exact composition of the mixture, the quantity produced and sold, 
the price of the feed, and the approved buyers. Similarly, the government controls 
most of the inputs used by dairy farmers, such as feed and medicine, and then 
specifies for what price and to whom they are allowed to sell their milk.   
Livestock producers who want to export face similar difficulties as exporters in other 
sectors of the economy.  Transaction and information costs are extremely high 
because of the poor transportation and export infrastructure.  Previously, most 
livestock passed through the border with Ethiopia, a route that is no longer open. 
There have also been some exports to Djibouti and Sudan, but future border trade 
with Sudan is somewhat uncertain and the difficulties of the trip to Djibouti are 
prohibitive for most.  At least initially, the unit costs associated with shipping 
livestock or livestock goods to other areas such as the Middle East are high.  More 
seriously, sanitation and health inspection and certification procedures are not yet 
adequately developed.  There are significant bottlenecks in the legislative process, 
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which seem to have indefinitely delayed the passage of draft legislation in this area.  
The MoA Regulatory Services Department is in the process of developing a regulatory 
framework for livestock export, but it is unclear whether the regulations are based on 
an adequate legal foundation.  Most markets in Europe and the Middle East will be 
difficult for Eritrea to penetrate without a well developed regulatory framework.  
Given that Eritrea’s neighbours have larger populations of small ruminants and 
cheaper sources of feed, Eritrea’s comparative advantage seems to be in specialized 
products such as organic or high quality deli meats (Government of Eritrea 2006).  
Eritrea could also have a comparative advantage in providing live animals that meet 
the regulatory standards of Middle Eastern countries, especially with the current 
development of Massawa port underway.13  However a trustworthy inspection and 
certification procedure is necessary for Eritrea’s more expensive specialty products 
and live animals to attract buyers.  This will be difficult to achieve without greater 
transparency and reliability in government procedures. 
Finally, government and party-owned businesses have crowded out private endeavours 
in the livestock sector, as in other sectors of the economy.  The following examples 
demonstrate the crowding out effect.  First, large state-owned plantations have been 
established in areas that had previously been valuable rangelands and watering points 
for privately-owned livestock herds, thus disrupting regular migration patterns.  
Second, state-owned dairy and meat processing plants or chick hatching facilities 
seem to have better access to credit, imported machinery, and supplies than their 
private counterparts.  Third, private enterprises have trouble hiring people with 
expertise since most graduates with agricultural training are required to work for the 
government.  Finally, unskilled labour is also unavailable because a large segment of 
the working age population is serving in the military or national service.  This is true 
even for family enterprises which are missing the labour of young adult relatives.  
Challenges to Public Livestock Activities 
Just as the livestock sector suffers from same problems that plague all private 
businesses in Eritrea, it also suffers from the same deficiencies that afflict all 
government services.  The MoA has a miniscule budget given its responsibilities.  It has 
few resources to invest in crucial infrastructure, such as livestock transportation, 
watering points, quarantine stations, and laboratory facilities.  It also has very limited 
extension services, in part because of a shortage of vehicles and fuel (Government of 
Eritrea 2006).  Service delivery is further compromised because ministry workers are 
poorly compensated for their efforts and because basic supplies, such as medicines, 
are often unavailable. 
The shortage of resources in the MoA is quite damaging to livestock production 
because the ministry is responsible many activities that are often the domain of the 
private sector in other countries.  The government is the sole provider of a number of 
services (such as artificial insemination, veterinary medicines and care, and 
slaughterhouses) often at subsidized rates.  It is also heavily invested in production 
and processing enterprises such as feed formulation plants, milk and meat processing 
factories, and chick hatching and distributing centres.  Finally the government is an 
important source of credit for livestock activities.  Given the very limited human and 
fiscal resources at the disposal of the MoA and related government units, they are 
unable to meet demand for services, especially in remote areas.  Rather than 
providing quality low cost services that benefit poor producers, the MoA ends up 
                                                 
13 Somali ports lack an internationally-recognized state to certify their inspections and they lack a strong enough government 
to enforce acceptable quarantines and regulations at the ports. 
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subsidizing inputs primarily for wealthier enterprises that can more easily access these 
government services (Dinucci and Fre 2003). 
The livestock sector is also damaged by the government’s lack of clear decision-
making procedures and weak institutionalization.  There is confusion over which 
ministry is responsible for matters concerning livestock export: Agriculture, Industry or 
Foreign Trade (Government of Eritrea 2006).  There is also some confusion over 
responsibilities between the new Ministry of National Development and the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  MoA employees also are not always clear about which unit within the MoA 
is in charge of which function, especially since the reorganization of the ministry.  
Finally the stalled decentralization process has left civil servants and the general 
public without a clear idea about how responsibilities and oversight are divided at the 
regional level between the local administrations and the MoA.  Nonetheless, the MoA 
seems to be more transparent and well organized than many other government 
ministries and agencies.  In contrast, the process for obtaining land is bewildering to 
most individuals and many have been waiting years without response after requesting 
land for cattle or poultry.  The same can be said for the procedures to obtain foreign 
currency, for purchasing materials and machinery from abroad, and for business 
permits. 
Livestock development and food security also suffer considerably from the lack of 
available and relevant information on livestock production, markets, and diseases.  
Information problems seem to be getting worse rather than better.  Government 
institutions have limited capacity for conducting policy relevant research.  The 
government’s decision to close down the University of Asmara and to transfer the 
Department of Agriculture faculty to Hamelmalo College of Agriculture will impede 
livestock research, at least in the short term, by limiting the number of institutions 
engaged in research on livestock issues.  Furthermore, the change is likely to create a 
deep division between agricultural training (which will be done primarily at 
Hamelmalo) and research (which will now be done almost exclusively at the National 
Agricultural Research Institute, NARI).  The physical distance between the two centres 
hinders contact.  Even more critically, independent sources of information about the 
livestock sector have all but disappeared since there is no private press and NGO and 
aid personnel have limited ability to travel.  The lack of non-governmental monitors 
can have grave consequences for food security as impending crises are more likely to 
go undetected, especially in remote areas.  In addition, there is an increasing culture 
of secrecy within the government that prevents information flow amongst government 
agencies and between the government and the population or aid community.  For 
example, the government did not release data on food availability in 2005.  The lack 
of official information and dialogue between donors and the government complicates 
the provision of speedy and appropriate responses to livestock crises (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2006).  In short, most policy-makers, private producers, and aid 
organizations are operating in a complete information vacuum with respect to the 
livestock sector.14  
Eritrea’s deteriorating relationship with foreign donors is detrimental to livestock 
development in other ways as well.  For example, the pull out of Danish International 
Development Assistance (DANIDA) was a major blow to dairy development; DANIDA had 
been the primary developer of cooling and pasteurizing facilities.  The government’s 
increasing restrictions on NGOs and foreign aid are particularly harmful for largely 
poor beneficiaries of these services.  For instance, some of the NGOs that had been 
involved in providing chicks and ruminants to women-headed households and war-
affected populations are no longer able to do so.  The Eritrean government has also 
                                                 
14 For example, the Eritrean Government initiated a program to provide beehives and apiculture equipment to anyone who 
wanted them, without first determining the availability of pollen and nectar and the appropriate carrying capacity of the 
environment.  Overstocking of bee colonies not only lowers production but can also lead colonies to migrate to other areas, 
thus defeating the purpose of the program (Government of Eritrea 2006). 
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made it virtually impossible for UN organizations to monitor and provide early 
warnings about declining food access, including those that would affect the livestock 
sector. 
Anti-Livestock Bias 
The challenges to livestock development discussed above are ones that afflict all 
sectors of the economy and government.  However, as noted earlier, the livestock 
sector is particularly disadvantaged vis-à-vis other sectors. Although well recognized 
by many, the bias is persistent and pernicious.  The bias has four different aspects: 1) 
favouritism of urban residents over rural residents; 2) favouritism of consumers over 
producers; 3) favouritism of highland residents over lowland residents; and 4) 
favouritism of sedentary mixed farming over pastoralism or agro-pastoralism.  What 
explains the bias against rural lowland livestock producers in favour of highland 
sedentary mixed farmers and urban consumers?  Why would officials pursue policies 
that are harmful to the overall economic fortunes of Eritrea and to the welfare of 
livestock producers? 
 
The current regime has a firm grip on power, but it has lost much of the public 
support that it once had.  In an effort to placate those closest to the seat of power, 
the government has shifted resources from the more distant, uneducated, poor and 
unorganized pastoralists and agro-pastoralists of the lowland areas in favour of 
culturally similar highland residents, especially those in and around the capital city as 
well as elites in the military or PFDJ party.  These tendencies are reinforced and 
justified by the official’s assessments of how best to achieve social and economic 
development as well as food security and national security (Bates 1981). 
Eritrea does not have national elections so the national leaders are less interested in 
gaining the support of the majority of the population than they are in winning the 
support of a minority of more powerful individuals or groups.  The current regime is 
inclined to try to appease those who are more concentrated, organized, wealthy, 
educated, and close to the President, military, and ruling party elites, because those 
individuals have the biggest potential impact on the regime’s survival.  This results in 
an urban bias to government policies in Eritrea, as it does in many other countries 
(Bates 1981).  The government has adopted policies (such as over-valuation of Eritrea's 
currency and price controls) and that keep the price of food and other essential item 
low for urban consumers, at the expense of rural producers.  In doing so, it helps buy 
the allegiance, or at least the acquiescence, of elites and civil servants who live in the 
capital, and the urban masses who have a greater potential to organize or riot against 
the government than their rural cousins.  
In Eritrea, the urban bias overlaps a regional and lifestyle bias.  Asmara, the centre of 
government, is located in the densely-populated highlands where sedentary mixed 
farmers predominate.  Highland residents tend to be more educated, wealthier, 
connected to people in power, and better organized than the agro-pastoralists and 
pastoralists who live in the sparsely populated lowland areas that are far from the 
capital.  Therefore, among the rural population, the highland residents are better able 
to make claims on the government than the lowland population.  The centralized 
structure of the government makes it difficult for distant and minority populations to 
influence government decision-makers.  Furthermore, there are no opposition political 
parties or associations capable of organizing the more remote and dispersed lowland 
populations and no independent media to articulate their interests and communicate 
their needs to the leaders.  Differences in ethnicity and language also hinder 
organization among agro-pastoralists and pastoralists as does their seasonal mobility.  
Livestock production is overwhelmingly done by small-scale producers who face a 
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collective action problem when it comes to achieving public goods like higher prices.  
Therefore, the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, who are responsible for the bulk of 
livestock production in Eritrea, tend to be “out of sight and out of mind” for most 
policy-makers and influential leaders. 
Government bias against livestock producers is not solely a function of socio-economic 
and geographic disadvantages of lowland populations, but also a legacy of historical 
divisions.  The majority of government officials are Tigrinya speakers from the 
highland areas with sedentary farming family backgrounds.  Tigrinyans are the most 
numerous in government partly because they acquired more education, wealth, and 
influence under previous Ethiopian and Italian regimes and partly because they belong 
to the largest ethnic group in the country.  In addition, Asmara is in the Tigrinya 
heartland.  Finally, Tigrinyans were also prevalent in the rebel army that won 
independence.  The EPLF, the predecessor of the PFDJ, was adamantly non-sectarian 
in its official orientation.  Nonetheless, the EPLF was formed by a breakaway group 
from the largely pastoral Muslim lowland ELF movement and drew more heavily from 
Asmara and its environs.  Whereas the ELF supported the nomadic lifestyle, the EPLF 
encouraged nomads to settle in return for services (Dinucci and Fre 2003).  The final 
EPLF military victory over the ELF in 1981 (in a civil war within the war for 
independence) resulted in a highland domination of the Eritrean movement for 
independence.  To a large extent, the ruling elite and civil servants today were drawn 
from the ranks of former EPLF fighters, so historical imbalances in the movement were 
reproduced in the current government.   
 
The dominance of political elites from sedentary farming backgrounds has engendered 
a policy orientation that favours crop over livestock production and sedentary over 
nomadic lifestyles (Dinucci and Fre 2003).  The bias is most evident in the 
government’s four top priority issues: food security, export promotion, socio-economic 
development, and national security.  First, food security has been defined as boosting 
crop production while the contribution of livestock to nutrition and survival is 
minimized.  Second, the government has focused on horticulture as the most 
promising source of rural export earnings even though livestock used to play a larger 
role historically in the export sector.  Third, the pastoral lifestyle is seen as a 
hindrance to social and economic development because officials claim that it is harder 
to provide educational, health, extension and other services to mobile populations.  
The government has adopted a policy of settling the nomad population, although there 
has not yet been a strong effort to implement the policy (Dinucci and Fre 2003).  
Fourth, the regime views Islamist organizations as a major threat to national security 
and has accused Sudan and Ethiopia of supporting Islamist terrorist groups operating 
within Eritrea.  The regime is also wary of a resurgence of the ELF.  Pastoral and agro-
pastoral livestock producers are largely Muslim, and their historical migration routes 
cross national borders, so they are potentially suspect in the eyes of the current 
leadership.  In short, national priorities have been defined in ways that privilege crop-
focused solutions over livestock focused solutions.  The chosen solutions seem to be 
more based on cultural orientations of decision-makers than on well-informed 
assessments of reality.15   
The bias against livestock occurs not only in the realm of policy-making, but also in 
policy implementation.  Most civil servants, at all levels of government, are from 
sedentary farming backgrounds where livestock are viewed as secondary to crop 
cultivation.  Therefore, funds and energies tend to flow to projects to improve crop 
production and away from projects to improve livestock production, although precise 
data on the extent of resource imbalances are not available.  The current institutional 
structure facilitates this siphoning off of resources from livestock activities.  
                                                 
15 Such state biases are by no means limited to Eritrea (Dinucci and Fre 2003). 
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Decentralization has not been fully implemented so decisions about resource 
allocation and personnel management are still done primarily from Asmara (where 
sedentary farmers predominate) rather than at the zoba level.16  In addition, the 
latest reorganization of the MoA removed divisions based on sectors in favour of 
divisions based on functions.  As a result, there is no longer a department specifically 
designated to oversee livestock production.  Instead, each department incorporates 
both crop and livestock activities.  The MoA policy draft noted the deleterious effect 
of this structure on livestock activities:  “Although the present institutional structures 
have been designed to maximize interaction among crop specialists and livestock 
experts, it needs to be acknowledged that in practice such interaction is not 
occurring, and livestock activities are suffering from being relegated to a secondary 
priority” (Government of Eritrea 2006).  Under the current MoA structure, it is more 
difficult to monitor the actual amount of resources devoted to livestock as opposed to 
crop activities, and there is no clear advocate for the livestock sector. 
Finally, the scarcity of research and data on agricultural outcomes means that 
incorrect assumptions or harmful biases are not exposed and corrected.  For example, 
the Ministry of Land, Water, and Environment has allocated large concessions of land 
for horticulture development in the riverine areas of the lowlands, thus depriving 
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists of traditional grazing pasturelands.  However, they 
have not carried out research on the relative advantage of horticulture versus 
commercial ranching or traditional pastoral practices in this area.  It could be that the 
government is lowering export earnings and food production by allocating the land and 
other resources to horticultural development instead of commercial livestock 
production, or the status quo of small-scale pastoral and agro-pastoral production. 
 
Socio-economic disadvantages, geographic location and distribution, the backgrounds 
and biases of government officials, and the lack of corrective mechanisms lead to a 
clear hierarchy of government policy beneficiaries: 1) military and party elites, 2) 
urban consumers, 3) primarily Christian Tigrinyan highland sedentary mixed farmers; 
and at the bottom 4) primarily Muslim non-Tigrinyan lowland pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists.  Resources tend to flow from livestock production to elite and urban 
consumption and crop production.  As a result, government actions exacerbate many 
of the constraints on livestock production identified by the National Agricultural 
Strategy.  For example, the government tends to award scarce foreign currency to 
military weapons, machines for government factories, and food and goods for urban 
consumers rather than for animal feed, veterinary medicines, vehicles for livestock 
transportation, laboratory facilities for animal diseases, or other livestock related 
investments.  Wells and dams are built in highland areas to service crop cultivation 
when the money might be better spent on constructing livestock watering points in 
lowland areas.  The allocation of territory in lowland riverine areas to horticulture 
farms compounds the encroachment of sedentary mixed farmers on rangelands.  NARI 
focuses its research on improving crop production at the expense of research on 
livestock production and MoA extension services are more developed in highland areas 
than lowland areas.  These are just a few examples of the underinvestment in 
livestock processes relative to other types of economic activity. 
                                                 
16
 Pastoralists or agro-pastoralists form an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants in three zobas: Red Sea North, Red Sea 
South and Gash-Barka. 
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Urban and Peri-Urban Dairy Farmers 
There is one class of livestock producers that have had some success in organizing to 
defend against extractive policies: urban and peri-urban dairy producers.  The dairy 
associations and the government recently negotiated higher prices for dairy products 
in some zobas and negotiations are ongoing in other regions.  However, these 
achievements were largely the result of defensive rather than offensive organizing.  
More importantly, recent government activities to co-opt and control the dairy 
associations threaten to erode the power of the organizations as well as the minor 
price concessions they recently won. 
Dairy producers in or near urban areas tend to have some education and wealth, and 
they are closer to government officials than rural producers.  MoA staff played a large 
role in initiating or facilitating the establishment of regional dairy associations, 
thereby overcoming collective action problems for these small-scale producers.  These 
dairy associations are organized at the zoba level and are managed democratically by 
members: regular elections are held to elect member representatives and larger 
decisions are approved by mass meetings.  Members pay fees and in return get access 
to goods and services such as fodder, medicine, transportation, and cooling or 
pasteurizing facilities.  There are also some small informal associations or groups that 
were started independently by members for mutual assistance in the provisioning of 
animal feed and other inputs. 
Urban and peri-urban producers have more influence by virtue of their educational 
and fiscal resources, proximity to government, and organizational capacity.  They also 
derived power by virtue of their ability to exit government controls.  Dairy activities 
are usually secondary sources of income so most producers are not dependent on their 
livestock for survival.  In addition, there is a domestic informal market for raw milk.  
The power of dairy farmers allowed them to resist, to a limited degree, government 
attempts to extract wealth for the benefit of urban consumers.  However, their ability 
to “exit” as individuals can also hinder attempts to organize collectively. 
Demand for milk (raw or pasteurized) far exceeds the supply and it increased 
considerably when the urban population swelled with returned refugees from Sudan, 
expellees from Ethiopia, people displaced by the war, and economic migrants.  Rather 
than let the price of milk escalate beyond the reach of most urban consumers, the 
government decided to set a price ceiling.  The price that factories paid to farmers 
was far below the informal market price for raw milk, and even below the production 
cost for many farmers.  In response, dairy farmers retreated to subsistence production 
or sold their milk directly to restaurants, cafes, and households.  For example, by 
2002 the milk collected by Asmara Dairy Factory had declined to one third of the 1999 
level.   
 
Faced with declining milk supplies and ever increasing demand, the government 
developed a multi-pronged response.  First, it agreed to negotiate with the officially 
sanctioned dairy associations to determine new prices.  The associations researched 
the production price and the government conceded to higher “temporary” prices in 
several regions.17  Second, the government stipulated that the officially recognized 
associations or factories were the sole legal buyers of milk in the main cities.  Those 
who sell milk outside official channels are to be penalized.  Third, where feasible, the 
government insists that animal feed will only be provided in return for, and in 
proportion to, the milk that farmers sell to the official buyers.  Nearly all urban and 
peri-urban dairy farmers must purchase animal feed to sustain their animals.  The 
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 Bargaining between the government and the dairy association occurred independently in each region.  It seems that the 
government has discouraged the formation of a single cross-regional association. 
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government can easily insure a steady supply of milk by maintaining strict control over 
feed and linking the provision of feed to milk collection.  This relieves it of the 
difficult task of monitoring the production of each farmer or patrolling illegal sales.  
Finally, the government now insists that independent associations or groups be 
incorporated into the larger official organizations.  The government wants to ensure 
that only those organizations that are dependent on government provision of feed and 
other inputs will continue to exist. 
The government claims that its new policy is to prevent disease by ensuring that milk 
is properly pasteurized or cooled, and that it is handled in a sanitary fashion.18  While 
this goal is admirable, there are several potential disadvantages of the government’s 
new approach.  The government is destroying the ability of dairy farmers to organize 
independently and to protect their interests or provide for their own survival.  In the 
event that the government provision and collection system does not function 
correctly, the entire dairy industry will suffer.  The weakened and dependent 
associations will also find it difficult to protect the prices that they secured through 
negotiations.  The government has already stated that the negotiated prices are 
temporary and subject to change once the new system is in place.  There is a strong 
temptation for government to reduce the price paid to dairy farmers in order to help 
urban consumers.  If this happens, the incentives for dairy production and the 
domestic supply will once again decline.  Dairy production may also decline if farmers 
decide to reduce the amount of feed that they give their animals so that they can sell 
their milk illegally at a higher price.  Poor nutrition leads to low milk production and 
poor reproduction. Finally, the government now has an interest in controlling the 
supply of animal feed rather than expanding it.  Since the scarcity of animal feed is 
the basis by which they ensure the supply of milk, government officials are likely to 
resist measures that allow private individuals independent access, whether through 
importation or green feed production.19  By depressing government incentives to 
alleviate feed shortages, the new approach may exacerbate the most serious 
constraint on livestock production in Eritrea.   
Benefits for Livestock Sector 
Although the general economic environment in Eritrea is unfavourable to livestock 
production, there are some factors that provide some cause for optimism.  First, 
patron-client ties do not dominate economic and political behaviour in Eritrea as they 
do in many other African countries.  It may be easier to organize poor producers in 
horizontal groupings that represent their interests if they are not already embedded in 
vertical structures that demand their loyalty.  For now, however, the lack of a patron-
client system means that most livestock producers are completely devoid of political 
influence.  Second, corruption has not yet permeated the norms and expectations of 
most Eritreans, even though it is on the rise.  As a result, behaviours are probably very 
susceptible to favourable changes in institutional and incentive structures.  Third, the 
government officially maintains a pro-poor policy orientation.  Individual and security 
concerns seem to have overcome this public purpose in many spheres, but the positive 
orientation may still exist for most officials and institutions and could possibly be 
harnessed to motivate changes.  Officially, rural development is recognized as being 
crucial for poverty alleviation and it has been named as a high priority for the 
government.  Finally, the government has engaged in several participatory policy 
                                                 
18 Notably, the government is implementing these new policies even were pasteurizing and cooling facilities can not 
accommodate the supply of milk. 
19
 The government recently allocated land to the dairy association in Dekemhare to produce green feed on a provisional 
basis, but they have not provided land for individuals in the same area who applied earlier.  Presumably the association will 
only provide the feed it produces to those members who sell their milk through the association. 
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processes that garnered considerable support from participants, including the 
constitution-making process, the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and the 
recent National Agricultural Strategy.  These processes can serve as a blueprint for 
more democratic and responsive policymaking procedures in the future.  In addition, 
they yielded important suggestions for beneficial policies.  In particular, the National 
Agricultural Strategy represents the first important step in the creation of a pro-poor 
livestock environment.  The key goal should thus be to bring actual practice in line 
with official pro-poor goals and policy statements. 
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PART IV: STRATEGIC ENTRY POINTS 
Chapter 10 of the Eritrean National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy 
provides a clear assessment of the main constraints to pro-poor livestock development 
in Eritrea and suggestions for how to alleviate these constraints (Government of 
Eritrea 2006).20  The recommendations are based on workshop consultations with 
stakeholders from key ministries, banks, NGOs, producer associations, and Zoba 
governments.21  The National Agricultural Strategy is the most representative and 
comprehensive analysis of livestock policy in Eritrea to date and it provides a valuable 
blueprint that can guide interventions or investments by the government, non-
governmental organizations, and the foreign aid community.   
Individuals consulted remarked about the high quality of the process used to generate 
the National Agricultural Strategy and the importance of the recommendations.  
However, many also expressed serious scepticism that the suggested remedies would 
actually be realized due to lack of resources and political will.  This section proposes 
possible interventions that can remove or reduce obstacles to the successful 
implementation of the National Agricultural Strategy and further the development of 
pro-poor livestock policies.  Practical strategies are suggested for bending the political 
incentives of influential individuals and groups towards the interests of the livestock-
dependent poor. 
Plan for Eventualities and Prioritize Policies 
The continued tensions with Ethiopia were the most often cited obstacle to the 
execution of the policy suggestions in the National Agricultural Strategy.  International 
pressure should be brought to bear on Ethiopia to speed the implementation of the 
border agreement.  However, such international pressure does not seem to be 
forthcoming and it could be a long time before the crisis is resolved.  Rather than 
delaying all actions indefinitely, provisions need to be made for the continuation or 
worsening of the border situation.  It is therefore suggested that the MoA develop 
three different implementation strategies: 1) a plan that would be feasible under the 
current conditions of continued tensions without open warfare; 2) a plan that would 
be feasible in the event that fighting resumes; and 3) a plan of action for if and when 
the crises is resolved.  Plans one and two will, by necessity, be extremely limited in 
their scope, but some of the recommendations are feasible even under these difficult 
conditions.  It is in the interest of the MoA to plan and budget for such eventualities 
and to regain the reform momentum rather than waiting for a change that may not 
happen for some time. 
Another obstacle to implementation of the National Agricultural Strategy is the lack of 
government resources.  The resource issue is related to the first obstacle; the conflict 
with Ethiopia is a major drain on government resources, private investment, and donor 
activity.  However, some of the suggested interventions in the National Agricultural 
Strategy are less costly than others.  In developing the three plans suggested above, 
the MoA should do a cost-benefit analysis of the interventions and prioritize activities 
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 The table “Main Constraints and Recommendations for Livestock Policy” from Chapter 10 of the Draft of the Eritrean 
National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy has been reproduced here in the appendix. 
21 The participatory process and the drafting of the policy were led by a team at the Ministry of Agriculture with assistance 
from FAO and Roger Norton, an external consultant.  Stakeholders were consulted about the creation and revision of terms of 
references, as well as the development of policies based on those terms. 
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accordingly.  In fact, many of the suggestions could even increase the amount of 
resources available to the government.  For example, the suggested tax on heads of 
livestock (recommendation 1 in appendix) would provide an incentive for owners to 
reduce herds to more sustainable levels, while also raising revenue that could be 
invested in infrastructure development that benefits the tax payers.  In addition, the 
suggested privatization of services such as artificial insemination and veterinary 
services (recommendation 9 in appendix) would free up government manpower and 
financial resources which could better be spent on subsidizing the costs of access for 
poor producers.  Access is often more important to the poor than low priced or free 
services. 
Finally, the recommended policies in the National Agricultural Strategy should be 
evaluated with respect to their effect on the most poor and disadvantaged populations 
in Eritrea.  The effect on these populations should be given special consideration in 
prioritizing policies.  The international community can play a valuable role in assisting 
the MoA in conducting cost-benefit calculations, and predicting the influence of the 
proposed policies on the poor. 
Cultivate Allies and Livestock Advocates 
Lack of political attention is another serious obstacle to implementation of the 
suggestions in the National Agricultural Strategy and to pro-poor livestock 
development.  The many political and institutional reasons for the lack of interest and 
investment in livestock production have been detailed above.  Livestock producers in 
Eritrea tend to be small-scale, poor, dispersed, unorganized, and powerless.  Most 
mechanisms of citizen influence are unavailable or ineffective in present day Eritrea.  
There is a need to find alternative mechanisms to alter political incentives so that the 
government leaders are more likely to act on the National Agricultural Strategy 
recommendations.  The most feasible way to do so is to cultivate more powerful allies 
and advocates for the livestock sector in general and for poor producers in particular.  
This can be done by:  
1. persuading influential individuals in government of the importance of livestock 
to their key policy goals;  
2. creating a separate Animal Production Department within the MoA;  
3. decentralizing government decision-making and service delivery;  
4. working with existing local institutions at the village or community level; 
5. strengthening producer associations;  
6. encouraging donors to target aid funding to livestock development; and  
7. enlisting Eritreans abroad in livestock development activities. 
The central policy goals of top decision-makers in Eritrea are acquiring more foreign 
currency; food security; poverty reduction and socio-economic development; and 
national security.  It is both necessary and possible for the MoA, producer associations, 
and livestock advocates to convince key elites that investments in livestock can make 
an important contribution to their key policy priorities.  Livestock and livestock 
products were important export commodities in the past and they could be again in 
the future.  Livestock are also essential to food security because they provide 
sustenance and savings that are less susceptible to the erratic rainfall than crops.  In 
addition, the poorest areas of Eritrea are most dependent on livestock and so any 
solution to poverty must improve the conditions for livestock.  Furthermore, livestock 
ownership provides a key means for individuals to accumulate wealth move to a more 
affluent and secure existence.  Finally, Muslim residents are only likely to support 
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Islamist terrorist groups if they feel that their lifestyles and livelihoods are under 
threat.  Programs that support pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, rather than 
marginalizing them, are important steps towards improving national security.  In the 
future, pleas for greater government investment in livestock should be couched in 
these terms to enhance the chances that influential elites will support them.   
 
It is also possible that the MoA can locate elite allies who have personal stakes in 
livestock because of their own investments or that of their family and friends.  Large 
scale ranching is very uncommon in Eritrea so there is not a clear wealthy 
constituency invested in livestock as in some other countries.  Nonetheless, it is 
possible that there are sympathetic elites from pastoral or agro-pastoral backgrounds 
who can be persuaded to influence policy in favour of their groups.  Additionally, 
there are a few larger-scale dairy farmers or meat, milk, shoe, leather, and feed 
factories that have some common interests with small-scale livestock producers and 
users.  The MoA should make attempts to involve the owners, managers, and workers 
in these larger scale enterprises in advocacy for livestock issues. 
 
Second, there is an urgent need to create a special unit within the MoA that can act as 
an advocate for livestock producers.  The National Agricultural Strategy suggests 
creating a separate Animal Production Department similar to the one in Botswana 
(recommendation 15 in appendix) (Government of Eritrea 2006).  The recent 
reorganization in the MoA makes it more likely that livestock activities will be 
subordinated to programs aimed at crop production. A new unit devoted to livestock 
could monitor allocation of resources within the MoA and push elites and government 
agencies to pay greater attention to livestock issues.  Despite the anti-livestock bias, 
the MoA, as a whole, is a strong potential ally because of the pro-poor and technical 
orientation of most of the civil servants at the MoA.  The creation of the National 
Agricultural Strategy itself is evidence of the MoA potential. 
Third, decentralization can help create and empower livestock advocates at the zoba 
level.  The MoA should make an effort to ensure that current plans for 
decentralization are implemented in a way that enhances local influence over 
decision-makers.  Whereas pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are a minority population 
at the national level, they form a majority in several zobas.22  In regions where 
livestock producers are sufficiently concentrated, government officials at the zoba 
and sub-zoba level may be more interested in and sympathetic to livestock issues than 
officials at the national level.  In addition, it will be much easier for pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists to reach government officials and services at the zoba capitals than 
in Asmara.  Finally, the convoluted central government bureaucracy has become a 
major impediment to all kinds of private sector activity.  It is more likely, though by 
no means guaranteed, that decentralization will reduce many of the transaction costs 
involved in obtaining government licenses and services. 
A note of caution is warranted with regards to decentralization.  The centrally 
appointed governors currently enjoy significant influence in the zoba administrations, 
although their power varies considerably across regions.  Rather than empowering 
technical persons or elected officials located at the zoba level, decentralization may 
further boost the influence of political appointees whose allegiance is to the top 
national leadership not to the inhabitants of their assigned territories.  Following 
decentralization zoba administrations will be responsible for development planning 
and implementation, as well for the performance of local line-ministry employees, 
functions that are currently carried out by technical persons at the central MoA 
                                                 
22 Although there is a mix of production types (and ethnicities) in each zoba, there are greater concentrations of pastoralists 
and agro-pastoralists in Gash-Barka, North Red Sea, and South Red Sea. 
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offices.  If centrally-appointed politicians control zoba and local administrations, then 
decentralization can actually make government less, not more, responsive to the 
concerns of the livestock-dependent poor. Furthermore, in a decentralized system, it 
may be harder to address the needs of transient livestock producers who move 
seasonally from one zoba to the next.  Finally, administrative capacity is much lower 
at the regional and local level than at the national level.  The MoA or the Ministry of 
National Development should conduct more analysis on the likely political impact of 
decentralization in order to identify strategies for empowering the livestock-
dependent poor within the future structures. 
Fourth, the MoA, NGOs, and aid organizations can find potential advocates for 
livestock producers in sub-zoba, kebabi (village clusters), and village-level political 
structures.  Local and traditional institutions such as the baitos and megebaayas 
(village assemblies) command significant respect and allegiance in Eritrea.  These 
local structures provide social safety nets and mechanisms for the equitable allocation 
of common resources such as land, water, food, and grazing area.  Local leaders are 
usually well aware of the needs and interests of their village mates and thus can 
potentially act as effective representatives between villagers and government, NGO, 
or aid personnel.  However, mobilizing village or community institutions to act as 
advocates may be difficult.  Prior attempts were met with some resistance.  Local 
leaders are accustomed to addressing internal village affairs or to implementing top 
down government directives.  They are less accustomed and willing to make claims on 
government in a bottom up fashion.  In addition, higher government officials are 
especially weary of attempts to empower and independently mobilize local 
populations; if they feel threatened, they can use appointed local administrators to 
disrupt the more democratic village and community decision-making structures (Favali 
and Pateman 2003).   
Fifth, producer associations are weak by international standards, but they are 
currently the strongest advocates for small-scale livestock producers in Eritrea.23  
Some dairy associations were already successful in bargaining for higher prices for 
their members and fattening, poultry, beekeeping, and herding associations could also 
be influential in similar ways.  The MoA and the aid community should invest in efforts 
to strengthen producer associations by providing training and resources to leaders, 
education on government structures and modern production techniques, and 
information about national and international markets.  It is equally important to help 
ensure that these organizations have legal standing so that they can engage with 
foreign businesses and NGOs independently from the government.  Facilitating 
cooperation at the national level of what have hitherto been only regional associations 
would also strengthen their power considerably.  Furthermore, study tours abroad for 
association members have proved very valuable educational and networking 
opportunities in the past.   
Importantly, the independence and power of the producer associations are extremely 
fragile; the government has undertaken activities aimed at co-opting the larger 
organizations and abolishing autonomous groups.  It is possible that stronger 
associations will help the government to better control the distribution of livestock 
and livestock products and thereby extract even greater resources from producers.  
Therefore, it is important for donors and aid organizations to monitor the relationship 
between of government and the associations to determine whether such investments 
continue to be beneficial to the poor producers.  In addition, the MoA or the Ministry 
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 For example, in Zoba Maekel (which includes the capital Asmara) there are four livestock associations and one horticulture 
association: 1) the association of cattle fattening with 87 members; 2) the association of poultry producers with 140 
members; 3) the association of beekeepers with 126 members; 4) the association of dairy producers consisting of 430 
members; and 5) the association of vegetable and fruit producers with 343 farmers (National Food Information System of 
Eritrea 2005).  The Ansoba Dairy Association has 200 members. 
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of National Development should search for mechanisms other than price controls to 
alleviate the eventual effects of higher livestock producer prices on the urban poor. 
Sixth, international organizations, aid agencies, and NGOs can promote pro-poor 
livestock policies by targeting their funds towards the livestock sector.  Foreigners 
must proceed with extreme caution; they have little influence over decision-making 
elites these days and they are in a precarious position.  If actions are interpreted as 
interference in domestic affairs, efforts could backfire in greater resistance from 
officials or expulsion.24  Instead of trying to influence policies, foreign aid 
organizations and NGOs may have greater success by targeting their funds at 
government selected and approved policies that benefit the livestock-dependent poor.  
Programs to provide livestock to internally displaced peoples, refugees, and women-
headed households have had success in the past, precisely because they respond to 
government requests and priorities.  The National Agricultural Strategy contains many 
other such approved policies that are deserving of support. 
Seventh, Eritreans living abroad can be important allies in the struggle to improve 
livestock development in Eritrea.  The diaspora have considerably more disposable 
income than most residents in Eritrea and some are from the lowland areas.  Eritreans 
living abroad have often been successful in securing land and permits for businesses 
because the government is interested in the foreign currency that they bring to the 
country.  The MoA and aid organizations should encourage the diaspora to invest in 
livestock or feed production as private businesses.  Furthermore, it is possible that the 
considerable remittances that the diaspora send each year could be pooled to support 
livestock development projects that will benefit their families in Eritrea. 
Locating and strengthening allies within the powerful elites, MoA, zoba 
administrations, village and community structures, producer associations, foreign aid 
organizations, and the Eritrean diaspora can help the alter the political calculations of 
leaders and civil servants so that the livestock sector receives the investment that its 
potential warrants. 
Upgrading Information Quality and Availability 
Improving the amount and flow of reliable and timely information will also help create 
political interest in productive livestock activities and facilitate the achievement of 
the stated policies.  Without data showing the contribution of livestock, it will be 
difficult to counter the current anti-livestock biases and persuade potential allies of 
the value of investing in livestock processes.  Important topics for research include 
(but are not limited to) the following: 
1. the relative costs and benefits of horticulture versus commercial ranching or 
traditional livestock production in the riverine lowland territories; 
2. the effects of expanding land under cultivation on livestock and pastoral 
lifestyles; 3) the prevalence and distribution of livestock diseases;  
3. the effects of decentralization on livestock policy-making and implementation;  
4. the impact on the poor of new policies to that require pasteurization and 
collection of milk at cooling facilities in urban areas;25  
                                                 
24
 The relationship between the FAO and the MoA in Eritrea is particularly problematic.  Bad feelings and suspicions on both 
sides constitute serious impediments to cooperation in the promotion of pro-poor livestock policies. 
25 In addition to assessing the impact of higher priced pasteurized milk on the consumption of the poor, a study should be 
done on how the urban poor prepare and consume unpasteurized milk.  Data on the frequency with which Eritreans boil their 
milk before consuming it is needed to determine the actual health benefits of pasteurization. 
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5. the market demands and requirements in the region for the export of livestock 
and livestock products;  
6. strategies to stabilize livestock markets in times of crisis; and 8) the 
implications of trekking compared to trucking of livestock to markets.   
Once researchers in the MoA, educational facilities, or aid organizations gather and 
analyze the data, these institutions should provide resources and pressure to ensure 
the distribution of that information.  The current custom of treating information as 
sensitive material that needs to be closely guarded is a serious constraint on 
development. 
Large changes are underway in the educational structure as a result of the closing of 
University of Asmara.  NARI and the educational institutions in Eritrea should act at 
this early stage to ensure that the connection between research and education and 
the quality of these two spheres are not undermined by the new developments.  One 
possible intervention to increase the spread of information is to encourage a closer 
relationship between NARI and agricultural training facilities such as Hamelmalo 
College of Agriculture, and between both of these institutions and centres of 
agricultural research abroad.  If students and teachers are involved in research, and if 
they have access to recent data, then they are more likely to appreciate and use such 
information throughout their professional careers.  For example, regular exchange or 
internship programs that cycle students, researchers, and lecturers in and out of the 
different agricultural institutions will help strengthen connections.  In addition, 
research collaborations should be encouraged across institutions.  Finally, the MoA 
should work with educational facilities and donors to establish a united system for 
sharing information, both within Eritrea (particularly between government agencies) 
and between Eritrea and the international community. 
Another institutional intervention would be for the MoA or Ministry of Foreign Trade to 
establish a livestock marketing information unit as suggested in the National 
Agricultural Strategy (Government of Eritrea 2006).  This unit could gather and 
analyze information on current prices, future demand and supply, importers’ rules and 
requirements, and transportation options and costs.  Producer organizations, 
government departments, private entrepreneurs, and export agents would then have 
access to up-to-date information on export markets and requirements.  The unit could 
also act as a liaison between Eritreans and foreign organizations on export issues. 
Finally, there is a need for greater investment in monitoring and evaluation systems as 
well as for greater cooperation between the government and international agencies in 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data on program outcomes.  Livestock 
policies and programs should be accompanied by plans and resources for tracking 
implementation and assessing outcomes.  Special attention should be paid to 
developing and collecting measurable indicators of how livestock policies affect the 
poorest Eritreans.  In addition, there should be predetermined mechanisms for revising 
policies based on evaluation results.  Much of the monitoring and evaluation of 
livestock programs can be carried out by the MoA, but the department of Monitoring 
and Evaluation at the Ministry of National Development and the National Statistics and 
Evaluation Office also have an important role to play.  It is crucial that these agencies 
are alert to the significance of collecting data on livestock production, prices, and 
consumption on an equal basis with crop statistics, and that the attention they give to 
lowland residents and pastoralists or agro-pastoralists is commensurate with what they 
give to highland residents and sedentary farmers. 
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Enact Laws and Systems for Exports 
The Ministry of Agriculture should aggressively examine possibilities for exportation of 
livestock and livestock products.  Several legal and institutional recommendations 
from the National Agricultural Strategy warrant special attention here.  It is essential 
that the MoA to work with the Ministry of Justice to speed up the enactment of 
livestock legislation (recommendation 8 in appendix).  Consultations for the 
development of the National Agricultural Strategy revealed that the needed legislation 
for sanitary inspection and certification procedures was already drafted some time ago 
(Government of Eritrea 2006).  However, the draft statutes have gotten tied up in the 
abstruse legislative process (seemingly at the Ministry of Justice) so that they have not 
yet been proclaimed and enacted.  This legislative bottleneck is hindering the 
development of a regulatory system that complies with international trade 
requirements.  Eritrea’s best prospects for livestock exports lie in high quality, 
specialty, or organic foods that can command higher prices in East African, Middle 
Eastern, and possibly European markets.  Eritrea could also achieve a comparative 
advantage in exporting live animals that meet the regulatory standards of Middle 
Eastern countries such as Egypt, Libya, Jordan; unlike many Red Sea ports, Eritrea has 
an internationally-recognized and capacious state that can certify inspections.  
However, without a regulatory system based on a solid legal foundation that is in 
harmony with international trade requirements, Eritrea will not be able to provide 
adequate quality assurance and thus will not be able to compete with the lower 
quality but cheaper goods an animals produced by its neighbours. 
Meeting requirements for regional exportation of livestock requires not only formal 
laws but also significant investments in veterinary services, transportation, shipping, 
and institutional capacity for monitoring and containing diseases.  These activities 
would be greatly facilitated by institutional changes that consolidate livestock export 
marketing functions under a single ministry or agency rather than the current situation 
where the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry, and Foreign Trade are all involved 
(Government of Eritrea 2006).  This agency could be responsible for: 1) establishing 
the essential infrastructure such as marshalling facilities, quarantine stations, staging 
points, laboratory and inspection facilities; 2) training more personnel in veterinary 
care and acceptable disease control and verification mechanisms; 3) providing 
appropriate marketing information; and 4) ensuring that private individuals or entities 
interested in livestock exports have access to credit, feed, and profitable unit 
transportation and shipping costs (recommendations 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 21 in appendix).   
Revise Land Policy 
The Ministry of Land, Water, and Environment should reconsider land policies with 
special attention to their effect on livestock production as well as pastoral and agro-
pastoral lifestyles (recommendation 5 in appendix).  In theory the Land Reform 
Proclamation of 1994 is beneficial to poverty reduction and development because it 
creates more secure tenure rights, provides land to women, and equalizes land 
holdings between villages.  However, the implementation of the law was stalled by 
the conflict with Ethiopia.  In practice, the partial implementation has created even 
greater uncertainty in land access and tenure than under the traditional system.  The 
process for acquiring land for commercial or subsistence purposes is obtuse and slow, 
and subject to bias and political influence.  Those who have access under traditional 
systems are uncertain about how long their tenure will last.  Furthermore, the current 
system speeds rather than halts damaging encroachment on traditional pasturelands.  
The government’s official policy goal is to “bring under cultivation vast tracts of 
fertile land” (Government of Eritrea 2004).  This policy seems to have been adopted 
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without sufficient analysis on how it might impact traditional herding practices.  In 
addition research is needed on the relative benefits for food security and poverty 
reduction of horticulture, commercial ranching, and traditional small-scale livestock 
production by pastoralists or agro-pastoralists.  A re-evaluation of the land policy, 
based on sound research and in consultation with the MoA, is urgent. 
Reduce Government Involvement and Control 
Lastly, livestock producers and their allies should pressure the political regime to 
abide by its officially stated policy of promoting “private sector development by 
creating conducive and business friendly environment that fosters competition” 
(Government of Eritrea 2004).  The National Agricultural Strategy properly recognizes 
that “Government’s role in livestock is regulatory and that production and processing 
should be in private hands, and strengthen that regulatory role” (Government of 
Eritrea 2006), yet the current trend has been in the opposite direction; the 
government has been playing a larger role in livestock production and processing over 
time.  The core regulatory functions of the MoA and the business environment have 
suffered as a result.  The MoA should privatize: veterinary care, artificial insemination 
services, importation and distribution and livestock medications, credit provision, feed 
importation and production, slaughterhouses, milk and meat processing facilities, and 
chick hatcheries (recommendations 4, 6, 9, 17, and 21 in appendix).  Currently, 
demand for these government services far outstrips supply and the livestock-
dependent poor are often crowded out by those with more resources and influence. 
Importantly, however, privatization without lifting controls will not alleviate 
shortages, provide incentives, deliver the benefits of competition, or free up 
government manpower.  The government should also avoid price fixing, rationing 
controls, and restrictive licensing.  For example, in order to reduce the main 
constraint on the livestock sector, the shortage of feed, the government should ease 
or abolish: 1) restrictions on opening feed plants; 2) requirements for importing feed 
ingredients; 3) quantity constraints on feed production; 4) feed price controls, and 5) 
rules about only selling to government approved buyers (recommendations 4 and 6 in 
appendix).  Instead of fixing prices for scarce commodities like milk, the MoA might 
consider taxing these goods and using the tax revenue to subsidize consumption for 
the poor.  Similarly, the state should subsidize private suppliers who deliver services 
and goods to remote areas rather than trying to provide services themselves at below 
market prices.  Subsidizing access for the poor is cheaper and more beneficial than 
setting prices.  Greater reliance on markets will also be less exacting on government 
and provide better incentives for private investment. 
Perhaps the most fundamental first step in this process of reducing government 
interventions and distortions is to allow a market-valued exchange rate.  Deflating the 
Nakfa to its correct value will reduce the need for artificial restrictions on imports 
such as feed, and it will make the export of Eritrean livestock and livestock products 
more competitive abroad.  A market-driven exchange rate may only be politically 
feasible if paired with more explicit taxes on remittances, such as a financial services 
tax. 
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APPENDIX 
Main Constraints and Recommendations for Livestock Policy From Draft of 
Eritrean National Agricultural Development Strategy and Policy 
Constraints/Issues Recommendations 
1) Degradation of rangeland 
from overgrazing. 
More watering points; over-sowing natural pastures; 
paddocks around watering points; reduction of herd sizes 
through higher taxes on livestock (with revenues going for 
local purposes). 
2) Insufficient livestock 
watering points. 
Develop more livestock water points, including on trekking 
routes to markets. 
3) Shortage of supplementary 
feed in dry season. 
Utilize more industrial by-products and domestic oilseeds; 
train farmers in conserving hay and crop residues and in cut 
and carry systems for crop residues. 
4) Lack of foreign exchange to 
import feed. Give priority to feed in foreign exchange allocations. 
5) Encroachment of crop 
cultivation on rangelands. 
Better land use planning in areas of potential conflict over 
use. 
6) Restrictive regulations on 
opening private feed plants. 
Remove the unnecessary restrictions for building feed 
plants; remove the requirement that such plants can sell 
only to approved buyers. 
7) Weak systems for disease 
control, insufficient 
institutional capacity in SPS and 
TBT issues. 
Install efficient laboratory support and infrastructure such as 
quarantine stations, check points along livestock routes, and 
livestock holding areas.  Train more manpower with 
adequate skills in this area.  Include draft animals in sanitary 
inspection programs. 
8) Lack of legislative framework 
for sanitary inspection and 
certification. 
Refine and approve the draft legislation in this area. 
9) Insufficient veterinary care. Train more veterinarians; privatize veterinary services. 
10) Poultry sector that is not 
fulfilling its potential 
Assign priority to importing feed for poultry; improve disease 
control systems (especially inoculations) for poultry, with 
emphasis on Newcastle disease.  Establish poultry breeders 
association. 
11) Underdeveloped export 
marketing. 
Develop systems of sanitary inspection and certification, and 
support for exports in early stages when unit shipping costs 
are high; send livestock experts to visit successful exporting 
countries such as Botswana. 
12) Competition in exports from 
neighboring countries with 
much larger national herds. 
Emphasize quality in live and processed animals, including 
organic meat and other specialty cuts. 
13) Insufficient vehicular 
transport to markets. 
Develop truck transport system for livestock sector. 
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14) Insufficient market demand 
to absorb appropriate levels of 
herd off-take. 
Develop canning industries to take surplus animals and to 
provide consumers with lower-cost sources of meat; develop 
livestock marketing infrastructure. 
15) Virtually non-existent 
livestock extension service; 
insufficient attention in general 
to livestock issues. 
Set up a separate Animal Production Department, as some 
other African countries have done; increase expenditures on 
livestock extension. 
16) Lack of breeding policy and 
support. 
Establish national livestock breeding station, train staff in 
goals of breeding, emphasize artificial insemination. 
17) Antiquated, unhygienic 
slaughterhouses. 
In addition to municipal slaughterhouses, allow private ones. 
18) Insufficient milk 
pasteurization facilities. 
Construct more milk pasteurization facilities. 
19) Lack of sufficient cooling 
and transport facilities for raw 
milk. 
Construct milk cooling and transport systems; train farmers 
in hygienic handling of raw milk. 
20) Outdated technology in 
tanning facilities. 
Provide training and financing for new technologies in 
tanning. 
21) Lack of sufficient credit for 
livestock. Development 
Better monitoring of loans to livestock sector; including 
financing for livestock in the ambit of the proposed second-
storey rediscount line. 
22) Poor collection network and 
poor handling of raw of material 
(hides and skins). 
Establish wider collection network for hides; give farmers at 
least two or three options regarding hide buyers. 
23) Low quality of domestic 
leather for footwear and lack of 
sufficient skilled labour. 
Train herders and tanners to improve quality; meanwhile, 
allow more imports of leather; bring in outside expertise for 
footwear design and development. 
24) Low honey yields in 
beekeeping. 
Reduce tendency to over-supply beehives in areas where 
there are modern ones; determine honeybee carrying 
capacity of each area; establish queen bee rearing centres; 
cultivate and conserve bee forage. 
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